Elaborado con IA a partir del resumen de los autores
Tesis doctoral que analiza dos objeciones centrales a la interpretación de Wittgenstein de Kripke sobre el seguimiento de reglas: la objetividad de la regla y la relación interna entre reglas y sus aplicaciones. El trabajo examina diferentes argumentos contra el lenguaje privado en la filosofía analítica para situar claramente la propuesta de Kripke. Identifica que tanto las versiones epistemológicas como las semánticas de ataques al lenguaje privado incurren en un círculo justificativo que no resuelven adecuadamente. Propone que Kripke reformula el problema como un escepticismo ontológico-semántico que cuestiona si nuestro uso actual corresponde con intenciones previas. Argumenta que el rechazo de condiciones de verdad para enunciados semánticos es la clave para resolver la objetividad de la regla, mientras que la estructura particular del desafío y el papel del acuerdo en juicios en la solución escéptica son fundamentales para resolver el problema de la relación interna.
Puntos clave
El lenguaje privado se entiende como la tesis de que las condiciones de significado del lenguaje pueden proporcionarse exclusivamente mediante estados mentales subjetivos, asociada con el escepticismo epistemológico.
Los argumentos epistemológicos contra el lenguaje privado caen en un círculo justificativo entre enunciados subjetivos y objetivos que las críticas posteriores tampoco logran resolver satisfactoriamente.
Kripke presenta el desafío escéptico como ontológico-semántico, preguntando cómo se sabe que el uso actual corresponde con intenciones previas, reformulando el problema central de la correspondencia.
El rechazo de condiciones de verdad para enunciados semánticos permite resolver el problema de la objetividad de la regla, fundamentando la corrección en condiciones de asertabilidad.
El papel del acuerdo en juicios en la solución escéptica de Kripke actúa como fundamento de atribución y es clave para resolver el problema de la relación interna entre reglas y aplicaciones.
Para quién: Estudiantes y especialistas en filosofía de la mente, teoría del lenguaje y epistemología interesados en Wittgenstein, Kripke y el debate sobre el seguimiento de reglas y el escepticismo semántico.
Resumen de los autores
This dissertation analyses two objections currently raised against Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation of rule-following considerations: The problem of OBJECTIVITY OF THE RULE: Can a single individual be right against communal assent?; and the problem of INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. The general strategy of the thesis is to examine different ways of attacking private language (PL) previous to Kripke's one. through contrast we are able to appreciate clearly the nature of Kripke's proposal, showing that mentioned objections cannot be applied to him. In the framework of this dissertation we understand PL as every theses that claim that conditions of meaning of language can be provided by subjective mental states exclusively, believes for instance, which explains usual association between PL and epistemological scepticism, and conviction that refutation of PL is as well a refutation of epistemological scepticism. There are two main versions of argument against PL. Epistemological versions (Malcolm, Fogelin, are considered) derive impossibility of PL from impossibility to establish corection/truth of a use or application of a given sign. Criticism to this version (Ayer, Thomson) indicates that argument concludes in a justificational circle between subjective and objective sentences. Semantical versions (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) try to avoid this circle elucidating its presuppositions, which are conditions of meaning of language allegedly neglected by privatist. This answer is no satisfactory, beacuse it raises the circle in a new, semantical level, or it doesn't work properly against justificational circle. with Stroud we indentify the common mistake of both strategies as consisting in proposals to beat the sceptic/privatist that requires either a FACTUAL PREMISE of to specify knowledge as part of the meaning of criterion conditions of significance elucidated in the questions of the sceptic or the claims of the privatist. Kripke imposes a change of direction in the argument because he poses a challenge with the form of a ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICAL SCEPTICISM, which is not based on limitations of privacy but, quite on the contrary, is grounded in the supposed advantages it offers. Kripke's Wittgenstein challenge asks for reasons we can have to be sure that we are not now committing a mistake consisting in a change of use. This is equivalent to ask: how do you now that your actual use CORRESPONDS with your previous intention or intention? From impossibility of answering this question concerning the key question of classical realism (correspondence) in the case of meaning (conceived as a special setting: idealised epistemic conditions) Kripke concludes that there cannot be truth conditions for semantical sentences. This motivates as sceptical paradox and a SCEPTICAL SOLUTION to it, in terms of assertability conditions. I largue that in rejection of truth conditions we have the key to solve the problem the objectivity of the rule, while the special from of the challenge and particular functioning of agreement in judgements in sceptical solution, as ground of attribution, is the key to solve the problem of internal relationships.
